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The terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001 left the 
whole country not only in shock, but in a high state of vulnerability.
1 American citizens around the world felt unsafe and desperately wanted to hold 
the attackers accountable for the innocent lives they took and the carnage they 
caused.2 Following the attacks, Congress authorized the use of a military force 
policy known as “targeted killings,” which became the essential tactic used to 
pursue those behind the 9/11 attacks.3 To execute targeted killings, the United 
States (U.S.) government began employing unmanned aircrafts known as 
drones.4 
When President Barack Obama took office, he not only inherited a 
country mired in a historically bad financial downturn, but a country also waging 
two “intractable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”5 While elected partly on the 
promise to swiftly end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and bring the 
American troops home, it eventually became clear the Obama administration had 
actually entered a third covert war when the administration escalated drone 
strikes in Pakistan.6 In recent years, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) have employed targeted killings as part of combat operations not 
only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also in counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, 




There are two principal techniques of targeted killings: kill or capture 
raids and air strikes. This Article focuses on the latter.8 Part I of this Article will 
focus on different types of new technology the U.S. employs to conduct lethal 
operations abroad. Part II will analyze the legality behind the U.S. actions when 
conducting drone-based targeted killings abroad. Finally, Part III will discuss 
whether judicial intervention could prompt accountability for targeted killing 
operations in foreign territories.  
I. THE USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY FOR TARGETED KILLINGS 
The U.S. has long used targeted killings as a combat method.9 
However, in recent years, this practice gained some unwanted media 
coverage, because the U.S. military and CIA were using drone strikes and 
kill/capture raids to engage in these operations.10 This Part first provides 
an overview of drones used by the U.S. government and then an overview 
of the law governing foreign targeted killing operations. 
A. Drones defined and their use in U.S. targeted killing operations 
The U. S. Department of Defense defines drones as an “unmanned 
powered aerial vehicle (UAV) that does not carry a human operator, … 
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.”11  
While drones have recently become a central focus in military 
strategies, and in the public eye as well, they are not a new creation. 
Drones have been around since at least the 1950’s, and some theorize they 
were invented soon after World War II ended.12 During the Vietnam War 
and the 1991 Gulf War, drones were used merely for reconnaissance 
missions, to gain information about an enemy or potential enemy. 13 
However, after the 9/11 attacks, drone technology improved dramatically 
and at the beginning of the 2000s, the U.S. was ready to employ drones 
“as launch vehicles for missiles.”14 
To satisfy the U.S. government’s need for low-cost, low-risk cross-
border aircrafts, the role of drones evolved rapidly from launch vehicles to 
attack vehicles.15 Drones became the cheapest, easiest, and safest means of 




expose themselves to battle conditions as drones could be piloted from the 
safety of a base far from the action.17 Additionally, targeted killings are 
easily accomplished, because combat drones’ attack capabilities provide a 
unique “target strike” opportunity because of the nature of the unmanned 
aircraft size and range.18  
Since 2009, the U.S. has deployed two types of combat drones for 
its targeted killings: the MQ-1 (AKA predator) and the MQ-9 (AKA 
reaper).19 A predator drone can operate on a “5,000 by 75-foot (1,524 
meters by 23 meters) hard-surface runway with clear line-of-sight to the 
ground data terminal antenna.”20 The ground data terminal antenna 
enables communication for takeoff and landing. 21 
 A predator drone has an aircraft system remotely piloted by a crew 
consisting of a pilot, who controls the aircraft and commands the mission; 
an enlisted aircrew member, who operates the sensors and weapons; and a 
mission coordinator, if the situation requires it.22 A predator drone’s fully 
operational system also includes “a four sensor/weapon controlled by a 
ground control station.”23 The ground control station manages the predator 
drone’s operations “via a line of sight data link or a satellite data link for 
beyond line of sight operations.”24  
A targeted predator drone killing can be so accurate a person could 
be resting on his back, while a predator drone hovers undetected over a 
house 2 miles or so away.25 A drone can then target a person’s entire body 
while remotely launching hellfire missiles “causing a fiery blast in real 
time.”26 In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in 
Pakistan, was the victim of a targeted killing conducted by a predator 
drone that tracked his whereabouts to his relative’s house before it 
launched a hellfire missile towards him.27  
A reaper drone is similar to a predator drone in design and 
function, but it is a newer and more heavily-armed version of the 




used for long-endurance missions. Specifically, a reaper drone is used 
primarily against “dynamic execution targets.”29 
A reaper drone has an operational altitude of 50,000rft (15,000 m) 
and a range of 1,000dnmi (1,150 mi; 1,850 km).30 Additionally, a reaper 
drone’s high loitering time, “range sensors, multi-mode communications 
suite, and precision weapons,” give this aircraft the ability to execute 
strikes on highly sensitive targets.31 It is considered especially useful for 
surveillance and support of ground troops. 32 As of 2009, the U.S. has at 
least 100 predator drones and 15 reaper drones.33 
Drones are used for targeted killings, because they are thought to 
be a more efficient weapon that allows targeting dangerous terrorists, 
without endangering American lives.34 The results do support this theory 
as hundreds of dangerous militants have been killed by unmanned 
aircrafts.35 For example, high ranking leaders of terrorist groups such as 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been targeted and killed.36 
 Two primary examples of these targeted killings are (1) the 
successful killing of Osama bin Laden, the figure behind the 9/11 attacks, 
and (2) the September 2011 drone strike on Anwar al-Awlaki, an 
American-born Yemeni cleric and an al-Qaeda propagandist in the 
Arabian Peninsula.37 By 2009, targeted killings escalated through an 
increase in unmanned drone strikes on al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in the 
Middle East.38 In all, more than 300 covert drone attacks have been 
registered in Pakistan alone.39  
The Obama administration has asserted the U.S. Government 
drone-based missile strikes comply with international law. 40 However, the 
lack of credible or verifiable information undermines their assertions.41 
The practice of targeted killings assumed on a systematic basis and 
without verifiable information is severely alarming and regressive.42 The 
use of drones and targeted killings policies could irreparably hurt the 
international legal framework created to uphold the most basic and 




As the CIA and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Special 
Operations forces increase their involvement in carrying out 
extraterritorial targeted killings through drone-based missile strikes, the 
inquiry about compliance with international humanitarian right to life law 
and international humanitarian law is critical.44 
B.  What legal framework of International law should lethal force be 
used?45 
International humanitarian law allows for the use of lethal force 
against fighters and terrorist groups, or civilians who are directly linked to 
hostilities.46 However, it is difficult to determine whether it is lawful to 
use lethal force against an individual who participates in hostilities when 
the individual, after delivering an attack, travels from a State engaged in 
conflict to a State not in conflict.47  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has opined 
about this issue, asserting that under International humanitarian law, such 
a person “should not be considered a legitimate target under the laws of 
war.” 48 The reasoning behind this opinion is that allowing otherwise 
would mean no country could exclude their land from battlefield 
consideration.49 Additionally, the ICRC fears any individual moving from 
one country to another could be considered a legitimate target under 
International humanitarian law, regardless of the territory where he is 
found.50 While the ICRC acknowledges individuals should be accountable 
for their actions, they are attempting to avoid the issue of disregarding 
territorial boundaries thereby treating the whole world as a battlefield.51 
While weapon treaties, or legal instruments of International 
humanitarian law, do not specifically mention drones, the use of drones as 
a weapon system in armed conflict is considered subject to the rules of 
International humanitarian law. 52 Under International humanitarian law, 
weapons capable of more precise attacks, minimizing civilian casualties 
and damages to infrastructure, are given preference over weapons that do 




casualties and destruction of infrastructure. Parties must stop attacks if 
casualties or harm to not-targeted individuals are anticipated.54 
Another law governing targeted killings and the use of drones is 
the universal right to life, which under International law is broadly 
regarded as the supreme right.55 The deprivation of human life “has been 
described as a rule of customary International law.” 56 Furthermore, the 
majority of State constitutions recognize a right against life deprivation. 
Under International humanitarian right law unlawful killings are 
universally criminalized as violations of the right to life war crimes, or 
crimes against humanities.57 
Under International humanitarian rights law, the intentional 
premeditated killing of a human being is unlawful.58 However, depending 
on the circumstances, intentional killings may not be considered against 
the law when it is the only way to respond to an imminent threat to life 
(e.g. hostage situations).59 “A well-established principle of International 
law is that International humanitarian right to life” applies during an 
armed conflict, “as a complement to International humanitarian law.”60 
Further, International law allows for the use of lethal force in self-defense 
when responding to an armed attack “as long as that force is necessary and 
proportionate.”61  
II. THE LEGALITY OF THE U.S.’ DRONE-BASED TARGETED 
KILLINGS ABROAD  
Policymakers, scholars, and the media frequently debate the 
legality of the U.S. drone-based targeted killings.62 This debate has been 
centered among two theories of law.63 The first theory, Jus ad bellum, 
governs the necessity and proportionality of the conduct of states and non-
state actors considering whether to engage in war and armed conflict.”64 
The second theory, Jus in Bello, governs “the conduct of individuals and 
units toward combatants, non-combatants, property, and the environment." 
65Jus ad bellum and jus in bello “were declared to be distinct normative 
universes, in order to postulate the principle that all conflicts shall be 




A. Jus Ad bellum analysis  
The U.S. government has reported the actions taken under the 
targeted killing’s policy “are consistent with the International law 
requirement for the use of self-defensive force.”67 President Obama’s 
administration has asserted that the U.S. does not need to make a 
proportionality-jus ad bellum analysis before each targeted drone strike 
undertaken since no more force than reasonably required to overcome the 
threat is being used.  
Additionally, on May 23, 2013, during a speech on 
counterterrorism, President Obama stated that the U.S. targeted killing 
policy is permissible against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and their associate 
forces.68 President Obama indicated that because a non-international 
armed conflict exists between the U.S. and these organizations, the U.S. 
government can “engage in at-will targeting of enemy belligerents,” under 
both domestic and international law.69 However, these justifications do not 
explain whether the hostilities between U.S. and Al-Qaeda rise to the level 
of an armed conflict, and if an armed conflict does exist how should the 
scope of the conflict be delimited.70 
The simple act of targeting individuals using drones intrinsically 
infringes upon international law since it is hard to determine, “who may 
lawfully be targeted and on what basis,” who is authorized to carry out the 
killing, and “the extent to which less-than-lethal measures are required to 
be used.”71  
Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s explanations, it is still 
unknown what legal basis the U.S. operates,72 especially since the U.S. has 
embarked on impermissible strikes “beyond the scope of any existing 
armed conflict.”73 For example, the 2009 targeted killings in Pakistan 
using predator drones, a country with which the U.S. is not at war and had 
not consented to the U.S. use of force in its territory.74  
Under the legal limitations of proportionality requirements of Jus 




all measures to capture insurgent suspects before employing targeting 
killings to avoid violations to international laws.  
B. Jus In Bello analysis 
Under the Jus In Bello theory of law, the targeted killing tactics 
used in certain drone-based operations are also evaluated for International 
humanitarian law violations.75 Jus In bello limits the consequences of 
armed conflicts on civilians not involved in armed conflicts, as well as, 
infrastructure and the environment.76  
A controversial argument is that drones are inherently 
indiscriminate, thus violating the “principle of distinction” upheld under 
this theory of law.77 The U. S. government does not comment on or 
acknowledge drone strikes that take place outside of hot battlefields, and 
keeps secret the list of targeted killings, making it impossible to know the 
actual number of civilian casualties. Additionally, because different 
standards are used to target citizens and non-citizens, the derogation is 
possible with regards to human rights instruments. However, absent 
derogation, human rights obligations do apply in times of armed conflicts 
under this theory of law.  
Humanitarian organizations are concerned with the potential 
psychological impact of drone strikes.78 One major problem is the level of 
stress and mental health consequences drone strikes have on the 
populations over which they hover.79 Specifically, the effect the constant 
presence of the aircrafts in the skies have on non-targeted individuals.80 
However, because the use of drones and drone strikes are performed under 
high levels of security, it is impossible to accurately determine their 
impact.81 This makes it imperative to require drones to make a distinction 
between military targets and civilian casualties.82 
Currently, the U.S. engages drones in operations targeting 
individuals with a mere past or present involvement in planning attacks 
regardless of whether or not specific evidence of imminent threat of attack 




deemed dangerous “based on undisclosed intelligence, applied against 
secret criteria.”84 These targets are then put on a list known as the 
kill/capture list.85 In Afghanistan alone, the U.S. has “six different 
kill/capture lists, with a total of thousands of names on them.”86 However, 
because of the level of secrecy these operations and the kill/capture list 
require, “the CIA will neither confirm nor deny their existence.”87 
Non-supporters of these practices argue the U.S. targeting policy 
degrades International humanitarian law and “undermines the legal 
framework meant to protect human rights in armed conflict.”88 Among the 
arguments made against targeting killings is that drone strikes are 
assassinations, and therefore, not authorized under International law.89 
However, supporters of drone-based targeted killings argue there is a 
distinction between illegal assassinations, and the lawful targeting in 
armed conflict of insurgents who represent a direct threat to the U.S.90  
III. ACCOUNTABILITY SOLUTION - JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The courts could offer the best prospect of compelling 
accountability for drone-related targeted killings.91 This may be 
accomplished by developing principles overseeing the insertion of names 
on kill/capture lists, by questioning the legality of the decision to kill, and 
by prosecuting those who kill in circumstances not allowed by law.92 The 
goal is to guarantee that matters involving national security are given 
specific considerations by preventing intelligence agencies from 
exercising their powers arbitrarily,93 and to provide legal recourse to “any 
person whose rights are violated.”94  
Some court systems have started to work on this issue.95 For 
example, the Israeli Supreme Court established conditions where targeted 
killings are authorized under the law.96 Additionally, the Israeli court has 
insisted on retroactive investigations on each targeted killing instance, to 
ensure it was pursuant to a lawful purpose.97 Similarly, the European 




need of individualized remedies to stop intelligence agency’s practice of 
human rights violations.98  
Unlike Israel and Europe, the U.S. courts do not currently enforce 
any form of judicial protections for these practices.99 It is close to 
impossible for an average individual, whose rights have been violated, to 
challenge the legality behind the actions of U.S. intelligence agencies, 
because an individual seeking remedies in the U.S. court system must first 
satisfy strict substantive and procedural standing requirements.100  
The Maher Arar’s case illustrates this principle.101 Maher Arar, a 
Canadian resident with double citizenship in Canada and Syria, was taken 
into U.S. custody in 2002 from the John F. Kennedy airport in New York. 
The U.S. government took Arar, because they believed he was involved 
with al-Qaeda. Then, he was rendered to Syria, where he was allegedly 
questioned and tortured for ten months.102 In 2009, Arar brought a civil 
action against the U.S. government, but the Second Circuit dismissed the 
case, because an appropriate remedy did not exist.103  
The court also stated its concerns about inquiring into the work of 
government agencies, foreign governments, as well as, potentially 
embarrassing the U.S. by disclosing classified/secret information.104 The 
court also relied on the separation of powers to dismiss the case, noting 
that this kind of lawsuit involves topics beyond the “limited experience 
and knowledge of the federal judiciary.”105 
After the U.S. court ruling, the Canadian government got involved 
and appointed an “independent commission of inquiry,” to look into 
Arar’s case.106 In gathering evidence, the commission questioned over 
seventy Canadian government officials and reviewed over 21,500 
government documents.107 At the end of the investigation, the commission 
prepared two factual reports with its findings: one confidential report with 
a summary of the evidence including classified information; and a second 
report with almost 400 pages of non-confidential evidence.108 After the 




an apology to Arar and compensated him based on the findings for C$10.5 
million, plus legal fees.109  
Another case dismissed by a U.S court was Al-Aulaqi v. Obama.110 
In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed this 
case, because there was “no convincing basis upon which Al-Aulaqi’s 
father could have standing to bring the case on behalf of his son.”111 Al-
Aulaqi, a joint U.S. and Yemen citizen who resided in Yemen, was killed 
by an AGM-114 Hellfire missile in September 2011, after the U.S. 
Treasury Department allegedly labeled him a “Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist” on a CIA kill list.112 The alleged U.S. Treasury 
Department actions took place after AL-Aulaqi made statements calling 
for “Jihad against the West and other related activities.”113 The U.S. 
government never confirmed nor denied the alleged inclusion of Al-
Aulaqi to the CIA kill list.114  
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia cited the 
political question doctrine in its dismissal.115 The court explained that 
judicial review is not possible on these type of cases, because a court 
cannot question a decision that the U.S. Constitution committed to the 
political branches.116 
CONCLUSION 
While terrorist attacks concern countries around the world, it is 
important to avoid letting a state of war against terrorism erode 
accountability of unlawful killings. The U.S. and its intelligence agencies 
do not have unlimited power to conduct lethal operations abroad, 
especially without a formal declaration of war. Citizens of each country 
have a right to due process of law before they are charged and killed by a 
drone-based strike.  
This Article provides a reminder that International humanitarian 
law exists to govern unlawful assassinations; to require transparency and 
accountability behind each drone based-targeted killing; and to call for a 




rights violations associated with new technologies such as unmanned 
drones.  
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